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EXHIBIT A 
LAST WILL AND TESTAMENT 
OF 
EUGENE DAVIS 
I, EUGENE DAVIS, a resident of Duchesne, Utah, being of 
sound and disposing mind, and not acting under duress, 
menace, fraud or undue influence of any person whatsoever, 
do make, publish and declare the following to be my Last 
Will and Testament, and I hereby revoke all previous wills 
and codicils which I have heretofore made. 
1. Appointment. I appoint my wife, ZELMA B. DAVIS, 
as personal representative without bond of this will and my 
estate. If my wife shall fail or cease to serve for any 
reason at any time, I appoint STEVEN R. DAVIS, and PATRICA 
ANN ZUFELT, acting jointly, to serve as co-personal 
representatives, to act without bond in her stead. If for 
any reason either of them cannot serve, the other may serve 
alone. 
2. Thirty Day Survivorship. In determining 
beneficiaries of this will, a beneficiary shall be deemed to 
have survived only if such survivorship is for at least 
thirty (30) days. 
3. Gift of Personal Effects. I give all my personal 
and household effects of tangible personal nature, such as 
jewelry, clothing, furniture, silverware, china, books and 
pictures, automobiles, boats, trailers, and other vehicles 
(excepting those used in my trade or business) in accordance 
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with the provisions of a writing executed pursuant to Utah 
Code Ann. sec. 75-2-513 (letter of last instruction) which I 
will keep with this will. In the event that I have not 
prepared such a writing, or to the extent that I have not 
disposed of my household and personal effects pursuant to 
such a writing, I give said property to my wife. But if my 
wife does not survive me, said property shall become part of 
my residuary estate. 
4. Residuary Estate, My "residuary estate" means all 
my real and personal property, which I may own at my death, 
including any community property, which I may own at my 
death, including any community property over which I have 
the right of testamentary disposition, (excluding property 
over which I may have power of appointment) and which I have 
not disposed of by other paragraphs of this will, I give 
all my residuary estate as follows: 
4,10 Debts and Taxes. My debts, administration 
expenses, funeral expenses, and all taxes payable by reason 
of my death shall be paid out of my residuary estate. 
Provided, however, my personal representative shall have the 
power to determine whether or not any or all of my debts 
shall be paid. 
4.20 Remainder of Residuary Estate Poured Over Into 
Living Trust. By trust agreement dated &/? 6^J^ 9^ * , 
entered into by me, and ZELMA B. DAVIS, as grantors and 
trustees, we created the EUGENE DAVIS and ZELMA B- DAVIS 
YOUNG 0005 
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Family Living Trust. I give the remainder of my residuary 
estate to the person who upon my death is to act as trustee 
of such trust, to be added to the principal of such trust 
and to be held, administered and distributed in accordance 
with the provisions of such trust agreement, including all 
amendments thereto, to the extent that it shall be valid to 
give effect to such amendments. The receipt of the trustee 
of such trust for the property comprising my residuary 
estate shall constitute a full discharge of my personal 
representative of the responsibility for such property, 
which shall thereupon be administered by the trustee of such 
trust free from the control or supervision of any court. I 
direct that no copy of such trust agreement, amendments 
thereto or any inventory or other records relating thereto 
shall be filed with records of any probate court, unless 
required by law. 
4.30 Alternate Disposition, If for any reason, the 
pour-over disposition in Paragraph 4,20 is not operative or 
is invalid, or if the Trust referred to therein fails or has 
been revoked, then I give the remainder of my residuary 
estate to my wife if she survives me, 
4.31 If my wife does not survive me, I give the 
remainder of my residuary estate as follows, first, my 
grandchildren, TERESA SWENSON, DARYN DAVIS, REXANNE DAVIS, 
NICOLE DAVIS, STEVEN E. DAVIS, and RUSSELL E. YOUNG, are to 
receive $1,000 each. The remaining residuary estate is then 
YOUNG 0006 
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to be divided in three equal parts, one third (1/3) to 
STEVEN R. DAVIS, one third (1/3) to PATRICA ANN ZUFELT, and 
one third (1/3) divided equally between REX E. DAVIS, and 
FAY DAVIS, If any of these beneficiaries shall not be then 
surviving, his or her share shall pass to his or her issue 
per stirpes. If any of them shall leave no issue, that 
person's share shall be given to those surviving or their 
issue per stirpes. 
5. Administration of Estate. If any person interested 
in my estate shall petition for supervised administration 
(PROBATE), such administration shall not be ordered unless 
the court finds that changed circumstances which I could not 
have anticipated would require supervised administration to 
protect the interests of my estate and its beneficiaries. 
6. Business. I authorize my personal representative 
to continue any unincorporated business or venture in which 
I am engaged at the time of my death in the same business 
form throughout the period of administration of my estate, 
if my personal representative in her sole discretion deems 
such continued operation of such business or venture to be 
in the best interest of my estate, 
7. Statement of Intent, I have intentionally made no 
provision in this Will for any other person, whether 
claiming to be an heir of mine or not. 
I, EUGENE DAVIS, the testator, sign my name to this 
instrument this day of £ ^ r 1993 
'vdfflfcW 
first duly sworn, do hereby declare to the undersigned 
authority that I sign and execute this instrument as my Last 
Will and that I sign it willingly, that I execute it as my 
free and voluntary act for the purposes expressed in it, and 
that I am eighteen (18) years of age or older, of sound 
mind, and under no constraint or undue influence, » 
EUGENE DAVIS 
t-^-^-yt f 
We , J, / ourP 'T.fto w e- Y-<{ and 
the witnesses, sign our names to this instrument or writing, 
being first duly sworn and do hereby declare to the 
undersigned authority that the testator signs and executes 
this instrument as his Last Will and that he signs it 
willingly, and that each of us, in the presence and hearing 
of the testator and of each other, hereby signs this will as 
witness to the testatorfs signing, and that each of us signs 
this will at the request of the testator, and that to the 
best of our knowledge the testator is eighteen (18) years of 
age or older, of sound mind, and under no constraint or 
undue influence. 
Witnes's ^ Witness 
Address Address
 yQmQ Q m 
5 
) 
) ss 
STATE OF UTAH 
COUNTY OF 
SUBSCRIBED, SWORN TO AND ACKNOWLEDGED b e f o r e me by 
EUGENE DAVIS, t h e t e s t a t o r , and s u b s c r i b e d and sworn t o 
before me by JM>/DC?SfiMfK and JjMM C /TlttMW. 
witnesses , th 1 S C ^day of (DOMVi; . 1 993 
NOTARY PU8UC 
SDWErHMOBRBl 
1772 Ctattau Street jBEsEk*im-tyfatf^&pta 3-30-1995 
Residing a 
Commission Expires 
(Seal) 
YOUNG 0009 
6 
EXHIBIT B 
LAST WILL AND TESTAMENT 
OF 
ZELMA B. DAVIS 
I, ZELMA B. DAVIS, a resident of Duchesne, Utah, being 
of sound and disposing mind, and not acting under duress, 
menace, fraud or undue influence of any person whatsoever, 
do make, publish and declare the following to be my Last 
Will and Testament, and I hereby revoke all previous wills 
and codicils which I have heretofore made. 
1. Appointment, I appoint my husband, EUGENE DAVIS, 
as personal representative without bond of this will and my 
estate. If my husband shall fail or cease to serve for any 
reason at any time, I appoint STEVEN R. DAVIS, and PATRICA 
ANN ZUFELT, acting jointly, to serve as co-personal 
representatives, to act without bond in his stead. If for 
any reason either of them cannot serve, the other may serve 
alone. 
2. Thirty-Day Survivorship. In determining 
beneficiaries of this will,, a beneficiary shall be deemed to 
have survived only if such survivorship is for at least 
thirty (30) days. YOUNG 0016 
3. Gift of Personal Effects. I give all my personal 
and household effects of tangible personal nature, such as 
jewelry, clothing, furniture, silverware, china, books and 
pictures, automobiles, boats, trailers, and other vehicles 
(excepting those used in my trade or business) in accordance 
with the provisions of writing executed pursuant to Utah 
Code Ann. sec. 75-2-513 (Letter of Last Instruction) which I 
will keep with this will. In the event that I have not 
prepared such a writing, or to the extent that I have not 
disposed of my household and personal effects pursuant to 
such a writing, I give said property to my husband, But if 
my husband does not survive me, said property shall become 
part of my residuary estate. 
4, Residuary Estate. My "residuary estate" means all 
my real and personal property, which I may own at my death, 
including any community property, which I may own at my 
death, including any community property over which I have 
the right of testamentary disposition, (excluding property 
over which I may have power of appointment) and which I have 
not disposed of by other paragraphs of this Will, I give 
all my residuary estate as follows: 
4.10 Debts and Taxes. My debts, administration 
expenses, funeral expenses, and all taxes payable by reason 
of my death shall be paid out of my residuary estate. 
Provided, however, my personal representative shall have the 
power to determine whether or not any or all of my debts 
shall be paid. 
4,20 Remainder of Residuary Estate Poured Over Into 
Living Trust. By trust agreement dated ^S7 ^CHA^J^^J /ff3 
entered into by me, and EUGENE DAVIS, as grantors and 
trustees, we created and placed in effect the EUGENE DAVIS 
YOUNG 0017 
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and ZELMA B. DAVIS Family Living Trust. I give the 
remainder of my residuary estate to the person who upon my 
death is to act as trustee of such trust, to be added to the 
principal of such trust and to be held, administered and 
distributed in accordance with the provisions of such trust 
agreement, including all amendments thereto, to the extent 
that it shall be valid to give effect to such amendments. 
The receipt of the trustee of such trust for the property 
comprising my residuary estate shall constitute a full 
discharge of my personal representative of the 
responsibility for such property, which shall thereupon be 
administered by the trustee of such trust free from the 
control or supervision of any court. I direct that no copy 
of such trust agreement, amendments thereto or any inventory 
or other records relating thereto shall be filed with 
records of any probate court, unless required by law. 
4.30 Alternate Disposition. If for any reason, the 
pour-over disposition in Paragraph 4,20 is not operative or 
is invalid, or if the Trust referred to therein fails or has 
been revoked,, then I give the remainder of my residuary 
estate to my husband if he survives me. 
4.31 If my husband does not survive me, I give the 
remainder of my residuary estate as follows, first, my 
grandchildren, TERESA SWENSON, DARYN DAVIS, REXANNE DAVIS, 
NICOLE DAVIS, STEVEN E. DAVIS, and RUSSELL E. YOUNG, are to 
receive $1,000.00 each. The remainder of the residuary 
YOUNG 0018 
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estate is then to be divided into three equal parts, one 
third (1/3) to STEVEN R. DAVIS, one third (1/3) to PATRICA 
ANN ZUFELT, and one third (1/3) divided equally between REX 
E. DAVIS, and FAY DAVIS. If any of these beneficiaries 
shall not be then surviving, his or her share sh&n pass to 
his or her issue per stirpes. If any of them shall leave no 
issue, that person's share shall be given those surviving or 
their issue per stirpes. 
5. Administration of Estate, If any person interested 
in my estate shall petition for supervised administration 
(PROBATE), such administration shall not be ordered unless 
the court finds that changed circumstances which I could not 
have anticipated would require supervised administration to 
protect the interests of my estate and its beneficiaries. 
6. Business. I authorize my personal representative 
to continue any unincorporated business or venture in which 
I am engaged at the time of my death in the same business 
form throughout the period of administration of my estate, 
if my personal representative in his sole discretion deems 
such continued operation of such business or venture to be 
in the best interest of my estate, 
7. Statement of Intent. I have intentionally made no 
provision in this Will for any other person, whether 
claiming to be an heir of mine or not. YOUNG 0019 
1/ ZELMA B. DAVIS, the testatrix, sign my name to this 
instrument this S77 day of thJ-l„ „ 1993, and being 
4 
first duly sworn, do hereby declare to the undersigned 
authority that I sign and execute this instrument as my Last 
Will and that I sign it willingly, that I execute it as my 
free and voluntary act for the purposes expressed in it, and 
that I am eighteen (18) years of age or older, of sound 
mind, and under no constraint or undue influence. 
L^^ZELMA B. DAVIS" 
We, iLvyof 18ov^e>:< and fthtttifop C+ M/X^^^ 
the witnesses, sign our names to this instrument or writing, 
being first duly sworn and do hereby declare to the 
undersigned authority that the testatrix signs and executes 
this instrument as her Last Will and that she signs it 
willingly, and that each of us, in the presence and hearing 
of the testatrix and of each other, hereby signs this will 
as witness to the testatrix's signing, and that each of us 
signs this will at the request of the testatrix, and that to 
the best of our knowledge the testatrix is eighteen (18) 
years of age or older, of sound mind, and under no 
constraint or undue influence. 
Witnes^ ^ Witness 
r^JL^O. -J^£~-
AA-^r^ri^ / jTAA^^^rL ~ « ~ r * 
— • *•—~ ••—» ~*—f-w—*—y f—« • — \ • M, ILP** 
Address Add ress YOUNG 0020 
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STATE OF UTAH 
COUNTY OF 
) ss. 
SUBSCRIBED, SWORN TO AND ACKNOWLEDGED before me by 
ZELMA B. DAVIS, the testatrix, and subscribed and sworn to 
before me by 
., this o< / day of/ witnesses, 1993, 
ssssssssssssss? 
NOTARY PU8UC 
STANLEY H.MORRELL 
1772 Ctafcau Street 
SiftLateClteUtah M118 
feCoaatekxitenkw: MM89S 
fARY PUJBLJC FOR UTAH 
Residing 
Commission Expires 
(Seal) 
YOUNG 0021 
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EXHIBIT C 
THE EUGENE DAVIS AND ZELMA B. DAVIS 
FAMILY LIVING TRUST 
THIS TRUST AGREEMENT dated this £7 day of 
(£&f , 1993, by and between EUGENE DAVIS, and ZELMA 
E. DAVIS, husband and wife, of Duchesne, Utah (referred to 
collectively as "Grantors" and singly as "Grantor") and 
themselves as Trustees. 
1.01 Initial Trust Estate. By this agreement, Grantors 
assign, convey, transfer, and deliver to the Trustees the 
property described in Schedule A attached hereto and the 
Trustees accept such property as the initial trust estate. 
Such property shall be held in trust and shall be administered 
and distributed upon the terms and conditions herein set 
forth. 
1.02 Additions to Trust. Grantors, or either of them, 
or any other person may from time to time transfer additional 
property to the Trustees upon the terms of this instrument. 
1.03 Name of Trust. While either Grantor is living, the 
trust hereby created shall be known as The EUGENE DAVIS and 
ZELMA B. DAVIS Family Living Trust. 
2.01 Powers Reserved by Grantors. YOUNG 0027 
(a) Revocation. While either grantor is living, 
the trust created by this instrument may be revoked, in whole 
or in part, by an instrument signed by Grantors, or the 
survivor of them, and delivered to the Trustees. Upon 
revocation, the Trustees shall promptly distribute to 
Grantors, or the survivor of them, all or the designated 
portion of the property comprising the trust estate, 
(b) Amendment, While either Grantor is living, 
this instrument may be amended in any respect by an instrument 
signed by the Grantors, or the survivor of them, and delivered 
to the Trustee. 
(c) Scope of Powers. The powers reserved by 
Grantors under this Article 2,01 are exercisable in the 
absolute discretion of Grantors and, except in conditions of 
mental incapacity (mental incapacity being established by 
written certification of mental incapacity by two physicians 
who are not beneficiaries and are not spouses, children or 
siblings of beneficiaries of this trust), neither the Trustees 
nor any beneficiary hereunder shall have any right or power to 
enforce or object to the exercise of such powers. 
2.02 Distribution of Income and Principal. While either 
Grantor is living, the Trustee shall hold, manage, invest, and 
reinvest the trust estate, collect the income therefrom and 
pay to Grantors, or to the survivor of them, all, none, or 
such part of the net income and principal of the trust estate 
as the Grantors may determine to be necessary for their 
medical care, maintenance, support, and reasonable comfort in 
YOUNG 0028 
their accustomed manner of living. 
2.03 Payment of Expenses and Taxes. Upon the death of 
each Grantor, the Trustee shall pay (1) the expenses of such 
Grantorfs last illness, funeral, and burial, (2) all in-
heritance, estate, and other death taxes that become payable 
by reason of such Grantor's death, and all unpaid income and 
gift taxes of such Grantor, and (3) the expenses of ad-
ministering such Grantor's estate. 
2.04 Distribution Following Death of Grantors. After 
the death of the survivor of Grantors, Trustee shall divide 
the remaining trust assets as follows. First, Grantor's 
grandchildren, TERESA SWENSEN, DARYN DAVIS, REXANNE DAVIS, 
NICOLE DAVIS, STEVEN E. DAVIS, and RUSSELL E. YOUNG, are to 
receive $1,000,00 each. The remaining trust assets are then to 
be divided into three equal parts, one third (1/3) to STEVEN 
R. DAVIS, one third (1/3) to PATRICA ANN ZUFELT, and one third 
(1/3) divided equally between REX E. DAVIS, and FAY DAVIS. 
Provided, however, if any of them shall not be then surviving, 
his or her share shall be given to his or her issue in per 
stirpes shares. If any of them shall not be then surviving 
and shall leave no issue, his or her share shall pass to the 
others or their issue. If there be no living beneficiaries, 
the principal of the Trust shall be distributed to the person 
or persons who would be Grantor's heirs by intestate 
YOUNG 0029 
succession according to the laws of Utah. l 
2.06 Distribution to Minors and Disabled Persons. 
(a) Grant of Permissive Authority. If any property 
of this trust passes under the provisions of this instrument 
to a minor or to a person who, in the judgment of the trustee, 
is unable to effectively manage or apply his or her estate to 
necessary ends (for such reasons as, but not limited to, age, 
marital problems, alcohol or drug problems, or affiliation 
with bizarre religious or political associations), then the 
Trustee, in its discretion, without giving or requiring bond, 
without intervention of a guardian, conservator or other 
representative, and without supervision of any court, may hold 
or distribute such property (referred to in this Article 2.06 
as the "protected property") in accordance with Article 
2.06(b). 
(b) In Trust. The Trustee may hold any protected 
property in a separate trust for such person, exercising as 
Trustee of such trust all the administrative powers conferred 
in this instrument upon the Trustee. The Trustee shall pay to 
such person all, none, or such part of the net income and 
principal of such trust as the Trustee may in its discretion 
from time to time determine. Such trust shall terminate when 
such person attains majority and becomes able, in the judgment 
of the Trustee, to effectively manage and apply his or her 
estate to necessary ends, or when such person dies, or when 
the Trust assets are exhausted by discretionary distribution 
or otherwise. Upon such termination, the Trustee shall dis-
tribute all property then belonging to such trust to such 
person or, if the trust terminates at such person!s death, to 
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the personal representative of such person's estate. 
3.01 Substitute Trustee. If either of the above named 
trustees fail or cease to serve for any reasons, the other 
may serve alone. If both of the above named trustees fail or 
cease to serve for any reasons, STEVEN R« DAVIS, and PATRICA 
ANN ZUFELT, acting jointly, shall serve as Co-Trustees, If for 
any reason either of them cannot serve, the other may serve 
alone. 
3.02 Powers of Substitute Trustees. Every substitute 
trustee shall have all the title, rights, powers, privileges, 
and duties herein conferred or imposed upon the original 
Trustee without any act of conveyance or transfer. No 
substitute trustee shall be obligated to examine the accounts, 
records, and acts of any previous trustee or any allocation of 
any trust estate, nor shall such substitute trustee be 
required to proceed against a previous trustee for any act or 
omission to act on the part of such previous trustee. 
3.03 Bonds Waived, Each trustee, including substitutes, 
shall be permitted to qualify without the necessity of giving 
a bond or other undertaking in this or any other jurisdiction 
for the faithful performance of such trustee's duties, or if 
any bond shall be required by law, statute, or rule of court, 
without the necessity of sureties thereon, 
4.01 Spendthrift Clause. Except as to Grantors' 
retained interests, no principal or income payable or to 
YOUNG 0031 
become payable under any trust established under this 
instrument may be assigned or encumbered by any beneficiary 
thereof, or be attached by or subjected to the interference or 
control of any creditor of such beneficiary or reached by any 
legal or equitable process in satisfaction of any debt or 
liability of such beneficiary prior to its actual receipt. 
5.01 Administration of Trusts. Each trust created by 
this instrument shall be administered free from the active 
supervision of the court having jurisdiction over such trust. 
5.02 Administrative Powers of Trustee. Trustee is 
authorized and empowered to exercise all powers granted to 
Trustees generally by Utah law. 
5.03 Accounting. The trustee shall keep all accounts 
and records of the trusts created herein and shall render to 
the current income beneficiaries statements showing all 
receipts, disbursements, and distributions of both principal 
and income of the trust. 
6.01 Thirty-Day Survivorship. In determining 
beneficiaries of the trusts created herein, a beneficiary 
shall be deemed to have survived only if such survivorship is 
for at least thirty (30) days. 
7.01 Governing Law. All questions as to the validity 
and construction of this instrument and of all trusts created 
by this instrument shall be interpreted by to Utah law. 
7.02 Miscellaneous. The singular shall be interpreted 
as the plural, and vice versa, if such treatment is necessary 
to interpret this agreement in accord with Grantors' manifest 
intention. Likewise, if either the feminine, masculine, or 
neuter gender should be one of the other genders, it shall be 
so treated. Further, any obvious typographical error shall 
YOUNG 0032 
also be so treated. The paragraph and subparagraph headings 
used herein are merely descriptive and shall not be considered 
in the interpretation of this trust agreement, 
IN WITNESS WHEREOF, the parties have executed this 
instrument on the day and year first above written. 
&cp^^ Jj7t /^C^o 
EUGENE DAVIS 
^__^ELMA B. DAVIS 
I^L^A-t-g-^ 
STATE OF UTAH 
COUNTY OF \f)fjOAUML^'\ 
SUBSCRIBED, SWORN TO, AND ACKNOWLEDGED before me by 
EUGENE DAVIS, and ZELMA B. DAVIS, this J?T 
t. 1993 . 
day of 
YOUNG 0033 
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NOTARY PUBUC 
STANLEY H.MORRELL 
1772CMnuStrMt 
•pMg=^ 
R e s i d i n g a(t ^^ |x< 
My Commission Expires 
(Seal 
EXHIBIT D 
DURABLE POWER OF ATTORNEY 
I, EUGENE DAVIS, of Duchesne, Utah hereby make, 
constitute, and appoint ZELMA B. DAVIS, my true and lawful 
attorney in fact for me and in my name, place, and stead, 
giving unto her full power to do and perform all and every act 
that I may lawfully do through an attorney in fact, and every 
proper power necessary to carry out the purposes for which the 
power is granted, with full power of substitution and 
revocation, hereby ratifying and affirming that which her 
substitute shall lawfully do or cause to be done by her or her 
substitute lawfully designated by virtue of the power herein 
conferred upon her. If she should fail or cease to serve for 
any reason, I appoint STEVEN R. DAVIS, and PATRICA ANN ZUFELT, 
acting jointly, to serve in her stead. 
This power shall not be affected by disability of myself, 
either physical or mental. 
DATED this jhP day of 
(?2> - 1993. 
^fi^-^^v QsU* <7 
EUGENE DAVIS // 
STATE OF UTAH ) 
COUNTY Q?\Ul£CJj^l / ) 
On the ^ Z ^ d a y o f (?('*C(?{/&£/ 1993, p e r s o n a l l y 
appeared before me EUGENE DAVIS, s igner of the fo rego ing 
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document, who duly acknowledged to me t h a t he executed t h e 
same . 
NOTARY PUBUC 
STANLEY H.M0RRELL 
^ 1772 Chtfnu Street 
. WlitoCfyUta}rM118 
fyConnbsion 6pto: HCM995 
iirnigimnftifiiwiuiiijui My commission exp i res 
(Seal ) 
YOUNG 0015 
2 
EXHIBIT E 
DURABLE POWER OF ATTORNEY 
I, ZELMA B. DAVIS, of Duchesne, Utah hereby make, 
constitute, and appoint EUGENE DAVIS, my true and lawful 
attorney in fact for me and in my name, place, and stead, 
giving unto him full power to do and perform all and every act 
that I may lawfully do through an attorney in fact, and every 
proper power necessary to carry out the purposes for which the 
power is granted, with full power of substitution and 
revocation, hereby ratifying and affirming that which his 
substitute shall lawfully do or cause to be done by him or his 
substitute lawfully designated by virtue of the power herein 
conferred upon him. If he should fail or cease to serve for 
any reason, I appoint STEVEN R- DAVIS, and PATRICA ANN ZUFELT, 
acting jointly, to serve in his stead. 
This power shall not be affected by disability of myself, 
either physical or mental, 
DATED this ^X~7 day of f?rJ*~fa^> 1993 
'JO-ixyA-^ ^ /3> . 
LKA B. DAVIS 
STATE OF UTAH ) 
COUNTY OY^jQCtf/JM^ ) ^ 
On the c^Tcfay of ((y GZ^ ^^^ 1993, personally 
appeared before me ZELMA B. DAVIS, signer of the foregoing 
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document, who duly acknowledged to me that she executed the 
same. 
(Seal) 
NOTARY PUBLIC/FOR UTAH 
Residing ai 
c 
z 
My commission expires •W/Urn^. id./WC 
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EXHIBIT F 
ljET~i^. -peJ^C- -Jfctfs C ^ < ^ , t^r-UtuJ^. ^J^L 
9 
' C ^ s ^ - I L ^ 
Q^M^ /O&'C^ 
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EXHIBIT G 
CODICIL TO THE 
LAST WILL AND TESTAMENT 
OF 
EUGENE DAVIS 
I, EUGENE DAVIS, a resident of Duchesne, Utah, being of 
sound and disposing mind, and not acing under duress, menace, 
fraud or undue influence of any person whatsoever, do make, 
publish and declare the following to be a Codicil to my Last Will 
and Testament. 
My Last Will and Testament, dated October 27, 1993, is 
hereby amended to provide as follows: 
Page 3, Section 4.31, the sentence beginning, MThe remaining 
residuary estate....11, is amended as follows. My great 
grandchildren, ETHAN OLSEN, and HOLDEN YOUNG, shall receive five 
hundred dollars ($500.00) each. 
My Grandchildren TERESA SWENSON, DARYN DAVIS, REXANNE DAVIS, 
NICOLE DAVIS, and STEVEN E. DAVIS shall each receive one thousand 
dollars, ($1,000,00), each, or a little more at the discretion of 
my personal representative. 
The remaining residuary estate shall then be divided by 
percentages among the following: STEVEN R. DAVIS, shall receive 
one fourth (1/4), PATRICIA ANN ZUFELT, shall receive one fourth, 
(1/4), RUSSELL E. YOUNG, shall receive one fourth, (1/4), and one 
fourth shall be divided between REX E. DAVIS, sixty percent 
YOUNG 0010 
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DEFENDANT 
(60%), and FAY DAVIS, fourty percent (40%) of the last one 
fourth. 
The 1st Codicil to my Will executed in the spring of 1994 is 
hereby revoked. All other paragraphs in my Will not in conflict 
with this Codicil shall remain in full force and effect. 
I, EUGENE DAVIS, the testator, sign my name to this 
instrument this // day of P^v^^ , 2000, and being 
first duly sworn, do hereby declare fp6 the undersigned authority 
that I sign and execute this instrument as a Codicil to my Last 
Will and that I sign it willingly, that I execute it as my free 
and voluntary act for the purposes expressed in it, and that I am 
eighteen (18) years of age or older, of sound mind, and under no 
constraint or undue influence. 
- ^ ^ ^ V f^/Z<Q& 
EUGENE D A V I S / ' 
the witnesses, sign our names to this instrument or writing, 
being first duly sworn and do hereby declare to the undersigned 
authority that the testator signs and executes this instrument as 
a Codicil to his Last Will and that he signs it willingly, and 
that each of us, in the presence and hearing of the testator and 
of each other, hereby signs this will as witness to the testators 
signing, and that each of us signs this will at the request of 
YOUNG 0011 
the testator, and that to the best of our knowledge the testator 
is eighteen (18) years of age or older, of sound mind, and under 
no constraint or undue influence, 
-f^fUk v %Z£^A, 
Address 
\ J A A /iAS (?, tiSjuU)^. 
.thess Witness (/~~ 
Address y-
) ss. 
STATE OF UTAH ) 
COUNTY V9Qj$/(#Mfa 
SUBSCRIBED, SWORN TO AND ACKNOWLEDGED before me by, EUGENE 
DAVIS, the t e s t a t o r , and subscr ibed and sworn to b e f o r e me by, 
/ / & aay of QrfjA, 
JAVJLS, rne re! 
V 
w i t n e s s e s , t h i s 
NOTARY PUBLIC 
Stanley H. Morrell 
1772 Chateau Avenue 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84118 
Commission Expires 
December 22, 2003 
STATE OF UTAH 
Commission e x p i r e s 
(Seal) 
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EXHIBIT H 
CODICIL TO THE 
LAST WILL AND TESTAMENT 
OF 
ZELMA B. DAVIS 
I, ZELMA B. DAVIS, a resident of Duchesne, Utah, being of 
sound and disposing mind, and not acing under duress, menace, 
fraud or undue influence of any person whatsoever,, do make, 
publish and declare the following to be a Codicil to my Last Will 
and Testament. 
My Last Will and Testament, dated October 27, 1993, is 
hereby amended to provide as follows: 
Page 3, Section 4.31, the sentence beginning, "The remainder 
of the residuary estate.../', is amended as follows. My great 
grandchildren, ETHAN OLSEN, and HOLDEN YOUNG, shall receive five 
hundred dollars ($500.00) each. 
My granchildren TERESA SWENSON, DARIN DAVIS, REXANNE DAVIS, 
NICOLE DAVIS, and STEVEN E. DAVIS, shall each receive one 
thousand dollars, ($1,000.00), or a little more at the discretion 
of my Personal Representative. 
The remaining* residuary estate shall then be divded by 
percentages among the following; STEVEN R. DAVIS, shall receive 
one fourth, (1/4), PATRICIA ANN ZUFELT, shall receive one fourth, 
(1/4), RUSSELL E. YOUNG, shall receive one fourth, (1/4), and one 
fourth shall be divided between REX E. DAVIS, sixty percent, 
DEFENDANT'S n
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(60%), and FAY DAVIS, fourty percent, (40%) of the last one 
fourth. 
The 1st Codicil to my Will executed in the spring of 1994 is 
hereby revoked. All other paragraphs in my Will not in conflict 
with this Codicil shall remain in full force and effect. 
I, ZELMA B. DAVIS, the testatrix, sign my name to this 
instrument this jjj day of (\JXy , 2000, and being 
first duly sworn, do hereby declare to the undersigned authority 
that I sign and execute this instrument as a Codicil to my Last 
Will and that I sign it willingly, that I execute it as my free 
and voluntary act for the purposes expressed in it, and that I am 
eighteen (18) years of age or older, of sound mind, and under no 
constraint or undue influence. 
OfalMK B. DAVIS 
the witnesses, sign our names to this instrument or writing, 
being first duly sworn and do hereby declare to the undersigned 
authority that the testatrix signs and executes this instrument 
as a Codicil to her Last Will and that she signs it willingly, 
and that each of us, in the presence and hearing of the testatrix 
and of each other, hereby signs this will as witness to the 
testatrix signing, and that each of us signs this will at the 
YOUNG 0023 
r eques t of t he t e s t a t r i x , and t h a t to t he best of our knowledge 
the t e s t a t r i x i s e ighteen (18) years of age or o l d e r , of sound 
mind, and under no c o n s t r a i n t or undue in f luence . 
m Witness (f~~ 
Address 
^Z&<^^ A>yiP_ (^. &>ar£ 
:riess 
1A3T ^DSJ 
Address 
STATE OF UTAH 
COUNTY OF) ^ 
) ss 
) 
SUBSCRIBED, SWORN TO AND ACKNOWLEDGED before me by, ZELMA B. 
DAVIS, the testatrix, and subscribed and sworn to before me by, 
OMPI^V E^m/A and A HUE. K.OPJ2TQlj± . 
1
 M -"'••-witnesses, this day of 2000. 
NOTARY PUBLIC 
Stanley H. Morrell 
1772 Chateau Avenue 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84118 
Commission Expires 
December 22, 2003 
STATE OF UTAH 
U B L 7 / 
Residing a t r A ^ ^ ^ / A H/&4 , 
Commission expires 
( S e a l ) 
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EXHIBIT I 
Recorded at Request of.. 
at . M. Fee Paid $_. 
by . Dep. Book- . Page Ref.:» 
Mail tax notice to_ 
QUIT-CLAIM DEED 
Eugene a n d Zelma B Dav i s T r u s t e e s 
D u c h e s n e 
of 
OUIT-CLAIM to 
Duchesne 
, County of 
R u s s e l l E.Young 
grantor 
, State of Utah, hereby 
r Duchesne Utah ,
 L S ^ 1 1 ^ 
oi tor t±ie sum of 
T e n DOLLARS, 
and o t h e r good & v a l u a b l e c o n s i d e r a t i o n 
the following; described tract of land in Duchesne County, 
State of Utah: 
N."1/2SW 1/4 Lo t 12-; NE 1/4 SW 1/4 S e c t i o n 6 T 4 S R 3 W USM 9.11.36 
• a c r e s 
I n c l u d i n g 41 s h a r e s of Gray Moun ta in I n d i a n Water 
E 3 6 0 6 . 2 5 B A 3 9 1 P 6 5 6 
Date B4-tHAR~2003 10:59am 
Fee: 11.00 Check 
CAROLYNE B MADSEN, RecoTdeT 
Filed By CLS 
FOT PAT ZUFELT 
DUCHESNE COUNTY CORPORATION 
r r w . 
| Sj^SSjv CORALEE SANCHEZ 
iy DUCHESNE, UT 84021 %f\c 
EXP. 5-2-2006 jfijm Ime yipuPfi^s^te 
"WITNESS the hand of said grantor , this ^ ckc^ 
A _ , , A. D. , 3 0 o \ 
day of 
Signed in the presence of 
STATE OF UTAH, 
County of iL^_<_u_ja^ > \ 
On the i s r . 
DEFENDANTS 
EXHIBIT N 0 . _ J 5 L 
dayof <SCK^^^^~^\ A D . 2 o o | I CASE N O . G ^ Q S Q ^ i 
personally appeared before me g ^ c ^ e , B . ^ o ^ ! DATE: CLK: 
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NOTARY PUBLIC 
the signer of the foregoing iJwfflSra«lw|, wficwoutyiraQfeaosvleage to me that he executed the 
, ._.. Duchesne. Utoh 64021 
J?) Commission Expires 
May 7. 2002 
STATE OF UTAH 
EXHIBIT J 
SNTRY NO. 
297889D A T BgM.zs .TIME^tfii— BOOK A ^ £ - P A G E ^ ^ W, 
QUITCLAIM DEED 
FOR VALUE RECEIVED, EUGENE DAVIS, and ZELMA DAVIS of 
D u c h e s n e , County of D u c h e s n e , S t a t e of Utah , g r a n t o r s , do he reby 
g r a n t , b a r g a i n , s e l l and convey u n t o Eugene D a v i s , and ZELMA B. 
DAVIS, t r u s t e e s of t h e EUGENE DAVIS and ZELMA B. DAVIS F a m i l y 
L i v i n g T r u s t , d a t e d ffr0$)(£7J#tf%. whose p r e s e n t m a i l i n g 
a d d r e s s i s Box 238, D u c h e s n e , Utah 84021 g r a n t e e s , t h e f o l l o w i n g 
d e s c r i b e d p r o p e r t y i n Duchesne Coun ty , Utah : 
See E x h i b i t "A" a t t a c h e d h e r e t o . 
S u b j e c t t o a l l l i e n s and encumbrances t h e r e o n . 
TO HAVE AND TO HOLD t h e s a i d p r e m i s e s , w i t h t h e i r 
a p p u r t e n a n c e s u n t o t h e s a i d g r a n t e e s and h e i r s and a s s i g n s 
f o r e v e r , 
IN WITNESS WHEREOF t h e s a i d g r a n t o r s have e x e c u t e d t h i s 
Q u i t c l a i m Deed t h i s * day of y / k o m k v . 1 9 9 3 . 
EUGENE FT) AVIS /~\ __ 
ELMA DAVIS 
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QUITCLAIM DEED PAGE 1 
STATE OF UTAH 
COUNTY OF 
On thisc , 1993, EUGENE DAVIS, 
and ZELMA DAVIS, known to me to be the persons whose names are 
subscribed to the within instrument, personally appeared before 
me and acknowledged that they executed the same. 
tfOTARY PUBLW FOR UTAH HOTAKYPUBUC STANLEY H.MORRELL 
_ t 7 7 2 Chateau Street 
Mt S * Late Clht Utah B4118 
% Gowtaston Expires: 3-30-19S5 
S&riUtaft 
y 
Residing at :\ ?/£^j.fm/M/f, 
& 
Commission exp i r e s Vmr/*4c0.#sr 
(Seal) 
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QUITCLAIM DEED PAGE 2 
Exfribxi: "A*> 
•Sppf^t^/ ' ' : geyefi-. ;.aM:;E^ 
? j $ § ^ ••'•; : > •••'••: 
* * *• 
J^"^ri=^"^^V:^^-^"^M:st;i.'-S"'fe©^i?^:$^ii!i>'";.:^S|©^34^9"* 51:4? ..a-crds:.%f-. l and , . 'mbre-..0r 
;?5^^ |^Efe}^fe^:^.^r.^%i-.;-^aiir.-iiii^rd§^^t.S7 sa:Bpu;r:t*eii^xice-s• t h,er.eunto 
;3*8|§i^^ .S£dt i on :.M, 
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I think it's totally consistent with the restatement section 
that we did cite to you. But I think you're correct, 
Your Honor. 
THE JUDGE: So it's not controlling. 
MR. SCHMUTZ: I don't... 
COURT'S RULING 
THE JUDGE: I have done some research on that 
issue, and the Utah courts have spoken as well as the a, 
Restatement of Trust. Utah law I believe is that absent of 
fraud or mistake a settlor has the power to modify a trust 
only if and to the extent that such power has been reserved 
by the terms of the trust. And the same rule applies to a 
settlor's power to revoke a trust. That is from Leggroan, 
L-E-G-G-R-0-A-N versus Zions Savings Bank and Trust, and 
cites in the citation in the Supreme Court citation. I 
assume this is a Supreme Court case, it was 1951 so it must 
have been, to the Restatement Second of Trust 331. And 
further says, 
Likewise if a settlor reserves powers 
to modify the trust only in a particular 
manner or in particular circumstances he 
can modify the trust only in that manner 
or under the circumstances. 
However, if the settlor does not 
specify the method of modification then 
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the power may be exercised by any method 
which sufficiently manifests his 
intention to modify the trust. 
In this case there was a, a reservation, a power to 
modify and a, I will, I have ruled in the past and I will now 
rule again that it can be modified only as provided in the 
Trust and that the statute that was relied upon is not 
applicable. 
If the statute were applicable here is my view of 
that. The statute as it exists today, of course, doesn't 
apply. But yet by its terms I think anticipates a valid 
execution of a codicil or a, or a trust or a devise. And 
in this case there wasn't a valid any of that because the 
Trust makes it so that gifts are not applicable. So any 
transfer, and this is what I ruled before in paragraph 6 of 
the conclusions. The deed itself was invalid because it 
wasn't supported by a fair value. I'm referring to 
EXHIBIT #15. And that consists, continues to be my view 
of the law that the trustee did not have it within his power 
to dispose of property individually certainly without a fair 
consideration. Because the terms of the Trust was or were 
that the purpose for the Trust... 
And let me suggest that whoever does this finding 
is going to have to review to the, the tape. It's not going 
to be possible for anybody to get all of this by notes. 
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It says, 
While either grantor is living the 
trustee shall... Mandatory. ... hold, 
manage, invest and reinvest the Trust, 
collect the income therefrom, and pay to 
the grantors or the survivors of them 
all, none, or any part of the net income 
and principle of the Trust estate as the 
grantor may determine to be necessary for 
medical, maintenance, support in 
reasonable comfort in their accustomed 
manner in living. 
That I think is a, a clear expression that would 
preclude either or both trustee acting in the capacity of a 
trustee to convey a gift. And a, I think that kind of 
answers all of the questions really but I'm going to go 
beyond, way beyond. 
With respect to the EXHIBIT #15, that is invalid 
because it exceeded the a, trustee's ability to convey. 
Likewise, well, I don't know that I need to make an 
analysis. I was prepared to make an analysis under the 
statute and I'll reserve the right to do that if it ever 
becomes necessary. But I'll just indicate that with respect 
to #16, because the trustee couldn't convey without 
consideration they were not a, privileged to devise without 
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consideration. And the only testimony I received as to 
consideration was that there was a discussion on value and 
they came up with a tax value, which I am not convinced in 
this case a, that tax values represents fair market value. 
I'm just not, I'm not convinced that there's any evidence in, 
before the court that fair market value is represented 
through the a, notification of the taxes. In fact a, it is 
a percentage of the value. 
So I will specifically find that the a, 77-7-605 
does not apply because it wasn't in effect for the same 
reason that counsel has argued, Mr. Schmutz, that the statute 
that Mr. Hatch relied upon which I think was 77, or— 
MR. HATCH: 75-7-816. 
THE JUDGE: 816 doesn't apply. They weren't in 
existence, no control. 
A 19..., or excuse me, a 2003 opinion of the 
appellate courts also stands for the proposition that if a 
settlor reserves a power to revoke only in a particular 
manner or under particular circumstances he can revoke the 
trust only in the manner and under those circumstances. 
That's Flake versus Flake and it's a, cited as 2003 UT 7, 
paragraph 1 3. 
And I think a proper application of the law is is 
that a, as I've indicated in my previous ruling that the a, 
the document, EXHIBIT #15, the Trust Deed January 1st, 2001 
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as well as the September 13th, 2001 Codicil do not modify the 
Trust or amend the Trust. 
I'd better also reserve the power to come back and 
revisit this because I am, I was surprised by some things but 
I think I'm ready to do this. 
I am comfortable with my prior ruling that I made 
that's been referred to, and that ruling I just looked at 
was dated August 1st, 2006. I indicated that because there 
was a confidential relationship that in looking at the 
signing of the Trust, and I'm going to go further than I 
think I need to in my ruling and, and talk about some other 
things that a, I would like to rule upon in case I have been 
wrong on my, just my ruling that the whole thing falls 
because there wasn't consideration. But I have indicated 
that because there was a, in that ruling because there was a 
confidential relationship the court would consider the mental 
health to determine whether or not the presumption of 
unfairness had been overcome. And I have done that. And 
there's been considerable testimony of that. 
I've indicated that unless the presumption was 
overcome the deed would fall. I still think that that's the 
rule because of the confidential relationship. 
And I've ruled that the Deed did not a, revoke or 
partially revoke the Trust or amend the Trust and that the 
trustee did not have power to transfer without 
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consideration. 
I'm prepared to take on the issue of whether or 
not I'm wrong on that, if I am wrong, whether or not this 
Deed, that is if I'm wrong that there's no effective 
transfer without a consideration did this Deed effectively 
transfer property. 
Before I do that I'd like to talk about the 
exhibits and make a few comments. I'll come back later on. 
EXHIBIT #1 #2 and #3 demonstrate, and the court 
thinks that it is so, that there is or were other assets that 
were transferred into the estate, no, to the Trust. I want 
to be precise. EXHIBIT #4... Although they weren't 
substantial. The Last Will and Testament of each of these 
people were identical except they mirrored each other as to 
the disposition and provided, I think as Mr. Schmutz has 
outlined, initially a gift of personal effects and then a 
gift to the a, and then the payment of taxes and, and debts, 
and then the remainder would go initially to the Trust. 
And if there wasn't a disposition of the remainder of the 
Trust, in other words, if the Trust failed for some reason or 
didn't exist, or if property was otherwise not disposed, 
provided that certain grandchildren would receive $1,000. 
That did include Russell Young. And that the remainder 
would be split up one-third between the children, Patricia, 
Steven and Rex, with Rex's one-third being split with his 
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ex-wife so they'd each get one-sixth. And that was the 
disposition of the Trust that was executed contemporaneous 
with the Will upon the death of the survivor. So I'm not 
going to... 
The Durable Power of Attorney, there was some 
argument that in signing EXHIBIT #15 Mr. Eugene Davis was 
acting in his capacity as the, as a, a holder of a Power of 
Attorney. I will rule specifically that that is not the 
case. If he would have intended to act both in his 
capacity as an individual or, and as exercising his Durable 
Power of Attorney he would have had to have two signatures 
there, one indicating that he was acting on behalf of 
Ms. Davis in his capacity as a, her attorney in fact. 
Moreover, I believe that the Durable Power of 
Attorney did not grant him power to function as a trustee 
unless it specifically said so. I say that because the 
duties are just completely different. And it gets confused 
in this case. But if we had another case we may have 
somebody who was a trustee and then a, granted to somebody 
else who wasn't a trustee a Durable Power of Attorney. 
There is nothing inherent in that grant of power to act 
which would enable them to act in the capacity of a trustee 
because a trustee a, is selected and the powers are 
designated by the settlor or grantor. 
And, and so I don't think it can be done anyway. I 
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don't think that giving somebody a Durable Power of Attorney 
allows them to act in their fiduciary capacity. That is if 
I give the Durable Power of Attorney to somebody else and I 
am also a fiduciary, that Power of Attorney does not grant to 
that person to exercise my powers as a fiduciary. I'm 
pretty clear on that in my mind. 
That would... What I'm saying applies to both 
Zelma's Last Will and Testament and Eugene's. 
Then in 1994 there was a document signed, not 
signed which I think is EXHIBITS #29 and #30 which a, I'm 
not going to give any effect to. Although those documents 
were, were referred to in later Codicils. Because I don't 
have signed documents here, I'm not prepared to honor them 
with anything more than the weight that they may be given 
because I've, I've a, considered a lot of evidence as to 
what the intent was. I do have statements from Mr. Davis, 
Steven Davis and Mr. Morrell that the, Mr. and Mrs. Davis, 
Eugene and Zelma expressed an intent in 1994 to dispose of 
their estate as indicated in EXHIBITS #29 and #30. 
Have I got the right exhibits? #29 is the Codicil 
and #30. Yes, I do. 
So I guess that's entitled the same kind of weight 
that I'm willing to give other, other people. And maybe more 
in fact because there was actually a document prepared 
consistent with the statements made by Mr. Morrell and 
COURT PROCEEDINGS 
PAGE 837 
1 
2 
3 
4 
5 
6 
7 
8 
9 
10 
11 
12 
13 
14 
15 
16 
17 
18 
19 
20 
21 
22 
23 
24 
25 
Mr. Steven Davis. 
Then I have the Codicils which were a, executed in 
2000. 
I probably ought to take a look at, for purposes of 
analysis this 1997 EXHIBIT #13. I agree that this is an 
effective Codicil to each of their Wills. 
The 2001, the July 11, 2000 Codicil didn't 
expressly remote, revoke this and I don't think it was 
revoked by implication either. So I view this as a valid 
testamentary amendment to the Will, mark that, Will, not 
to the Trust, which I think as Mr. Schmutz pointed out is 
an express gift and so it doesn't fall into the residuary, 
so it doesn't pour over into the Trust. So if there's 
5,000, or was 5,000 in the estate after the other things 
happened, and I'm not ruling upon this, I guess there's an 
argument about which comes first, the payment of taxes and 
debts or the 5,000, nobody has asked me to rule upon that, 
and I'm not— 
MR. SCHMUTZ: Well, the Will certainly puts them 
in sequence and in order, states what is paid first. 
Paragraph 4 precedes paragraph 5, states that that it should 
be distributed in that order. 
THE JUDGE: Well, paragraph 4 is just the 
residuary clause and it merely transfers the, the a, the 
property to the Trust. So 4 doesn't have any application 
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here. Paragraph 3 and, and 4 says that after it's 
transferred to the Trust you pay the debts. Okay? And a, 
paragraph 3 is a gift of personal effects. I guess that 
this is on a footing of personal effects and I suspect 
without ruling that he gets $5,000 as a result of 
EXHIBIT #13. 
Then we get to a Codicil that was a, executed 
July 11th. And it doesn't change, it changes the 
distribution to indicate a, my great grandchildren Ethan 
Olsen and Holden Young shall receive $500 each. My 
grandchildren, Teresa Swenson, Darren Davis, Rexann Davis, 
Nicole Davis, Steve Davis, 1,000. And I will note that that 
excludes Russell. 
And a, then that he gets, Russell gets one-quarter 
as well as his mother. And a, Steven and Rex receives 60% of 
one-quarter which I think I looked at last night I think is 
15% and a, his wife received 10% of a quarter of I think is 
10%. 
All right. The little background here. Prior 
to the a, prior to October of a, or rather December of 1993 
the property that we're going to talk about, the real 
property, as well as the property that is now in Trust was 
all owned by Mr. and Mrs. Davis in some capacity, I suppose. 
I don't need to go into how they owned the property in 
terms of joint tenants, tenants. But there is a deed that 
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is dated on the 2nd day of December which transfers the real 
property, that is the 91 acres as well as the a, home and 
some lots around the home to the Trust. 
I don't have any knowledge or understanding of 
whether anything else was transferred to the Trust except I 
believe that the bank accounts were based upon one, two and 
three. 
I want to speak to the lease. There were two or 
three reasons for the lease one could take from the 
evidence. And understand that I don't have the lease in a, 
admitted and so I'm referring only to the lease in the 
abstract. But as I understand the lease it was for two 
years, from the testimony. It was given at apparently in 
1999 at the direction or a, to assist Mr. Young with income 
tax issues with respect to expenses on the farm. It 
provided for two years. And a, the testimony is that $50 
was paid. So you could argue that it was for $10 a period, 
that a, it would go on for 10 years and be renewable beyond 
that. But it's been paid in full for 10 years. 
MR. HATCH: With $50, Your Honor? Or would that 
require $100? 
THE JUDGE: I guess it would require, it would be 
for $10 a year, five years. 
MR. HATCH: Thank you. 
THE JUDGE: Five years for two year periods would 
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be 10 years. Don't confuse me. 
MR. HATCH: Well, the testimony was that it was 
each year, $10 a year each year. 
THE JUDGE: I don't think that was the 
testimony. But I'm not concerned about it because— 
MR. HATCH: Okay. 
THE JUDGE: — to the extent the lease is relied 
upon to transfer some interest in the property, it is not a, 
it falls for the same reasons, without consideration. And 
there's no indication at all in this case that the lease was 
even between the a, Trust and the a, and Mr. Davis. I'm 
unclear as to what the lease was according to the evidence. 
It said there was a lease but there's no testimony that the 
lease was involved with the Trust. 
Furthermore it does fall, as I think I've 
indicated, because to the extent it purports to dispose, in 
effect dispose of the property by allowing a lease to be 
renewed at the rate of $10 every two years or every year 
depending on, it wouldn't make any difference, that 
contravenes the power of, it goes beyond the power of the 
trustee to do such a thing in my judgment. 
I'm going to go back to a, #15, we'll spend quite a 
little bit of time on #15. 
#16, to the extent, if I could find it. I'm 
doing good up to this point, now I can't find an exhibit. 
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To the extent that that Codicil may be valid, and 
again I do not think it is valid for the reasons I've stated 
because it couldn't be disposed of without consideration, it 
also fails for another reason. It provided for a, payments 
to begin when the a, well, it did not specifically provide 
but the way I think the law would require that they began 
making payments as soon as the Will become effective, which 
they had knowledge of, Mr. Young had knowledge of a, this 
document, reviewed it. It provided that there be payments 
for five years at a, six years at 5,000 a year. It is, it 
is his obligation to perform that. He's got to tender 
performance. That never happened in this case, it simply 
never happened. 
As I indicated, any discussion with Mr. Gillespie 
by prior to the time of the death of Mrs.... 
MS. BARTON-COOMBS: Davis. 
THE JUDGE: Mrs. Davis is not effective. And in 
fact, no discussion with Mr. Gillespie would have been 
appropriate at any time because this is a Codicil that does 
not... Mr. Davis cannot a, amend Mrs. Davis's Will. This 
does not purport to do that. 
It's got all kinds of problems. I mean it's, 
Mr. Davis didn't have full title to the property, he didn't 
purport to act certainly here as the trustee, he was acting 
as a, a testator if anything. And he simply, as I've 
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indicated couldn't a, take this out of the Trust through this 
instrument. This instrument is not appropriate to take it 
out of the Trust. 
To the extent it was, and if it was effective 
then a, Mr. Davis died in March of 2003 and the payments 
should have been made. There's been no payments. He's just 
failed to perform under it. So this, for all those reasons 
this document is wholly incapable of transferring the 
property. 
In a general sense it is true that a Trust a... 
Well let me, let me back up. 
In a general sense it is true that Wills can only 
dispose of property that's held in the individual name of 
the testator. Here, of course, that property was either 
still in the Trust name, or if EXHIBIT #13 is, not #13, #15 
was effective to transfer the property to Mr. Young it was in 
Mr. Young's possession. So I can see of no circumstances 
under which the property could be affected through 
EXHIBIT #16. It just, it just wasn't part of what 
Mr. Davis could a, unilaterally, unilaterally do. 
And, and I'm trying to make this clear in my mind 
so I can be clear in your mind. Remember, he did not 
purport to act in any capacity other than a testator. And I 
don't think that acting in the capacity of a testator 
indicates that he's exercising any power as trustee, 
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firstly. Second, it was without consideration. That is a 
trustee couldn't give something for full value. This 
obviously wasn't for full value. And finally, there's no 
performance on the part of Mr. Young in compliance. That is 
if it was part of his estate he should have been looking 
towards somebody. And there was somebody appointed to 
administer the estate this whole time so he, he had somebody 
to go to, the evidence is that a, Mr. Steven Davis had been 
appointed in that capacity. 
Okay. I'd like to enter into a little discussion 
on trusts. Trusts are an independent entity and separate 
from settlors or grantors who create the Trust. And so 
there is not an identity of interest between a settlor and 
a, the Trust. Specifically with respect to title trusts 
are often used as a mechanism to make titled property 
unavailable for some purposes which they would be available 
for if they continued to be held by the grantor. 
It is significant legally that there is a 
distinction. And when title transfers from a settlor to a 
trustee of a valid Trust, which there is in this case, no 
question about that, a lot of things change. As I alluded 
to, at that point in time the trust needs to be complied 
with, the terms of the trust needs to be complied with. 
The trustee who was the a, settlor does not have 
unfettered discretion to use the property as he or she 
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would have prior to the transfer. And particularly in this 
case when there is more than one trustee and more than one 
beneficiary, any trustee who acts must also act in 
recognition of the rights and duties that they hold and 
obligations they have to the other trustee. And in this 
case a, Mr. Davis had an obligation to act in recognition of 
the duty owed to Mrs. Davis, and he could not unilaterally 
transfer the property in violation of the provisions of the 
Trust which set forth the purpose for the Trust. 
I think that that answers his a, that when combined 
with my prior ruling that a, the a, exhibit, and I'll 
reaffirm that after hearing the evidence in this case and 
considering the law, EXHIBIT #15 did not alter or amend the 
Trust in this case. 
There was an issue as to capacity, and that's 
pretty complicated, and intent. This idea, as I've 
indicated, of intent is pretty elusive. I have expressed 
some preference to writings, and I think that there's a 
really good reason to give preference to writings from the 
point of logic and also law. First of all, written 
documents by their very nature require more attention and 
review than something that may be said, said off the cuff. 
Written documents are also a, by their nature, and 
particularly in this case, intended by the person who 
signs them, these were notarized and signed, to be relied 
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upon, which is not true for written (sic?) expressions. 
In fact, the law does not allow transfer through a written 
(sic?) expression, it requires a writing. 
So I believe I've pointed out some of the 
difficulty with the testimony that I've received as to 
intent. And I guess intent by its nature, I'm not 
necessarily referring to this case, depends upon when, how 
and why. And it changes over time. 
I believe based upon all of the evidence if I were 
to ascertain a general intent with respect to this property 
I would conclude, based upon the evidence, and there is 
direct evidence to this statement, that their general intent 
over time was that Mr. Young receive the property but that 
he pay for it. 
I'm bothered, I'm trying to find it, by such 
things as the fact that on the day that Mr. Morrell came to 
talk to them about their intent, Mr. and Mrs. Davis's intent 
in disposing of their property, there was a general 
statement in the presence of Mr. Young that they intended 
Russell to have the farm. And that there was a specific 
intent which was memorialized a, in the document that was 
prepared in 1993 and later reaffirmed in other formalized 
documents that did not provide a direct distribution to 
Mr. Young. 
The difficulty, the poster child for this is the 
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testimony of Mrs. Bertola. She was asked to serve as a 
witness to a document dated July 11th, 2000 which document 
provided Mr. Russell Young would get a one-quarter 
interest. But her report was that she was told that 
Russell would get the farm and everything else would be 
split. Within minutes of that expression Mr. and Mrs. 
Davis signed a document which was directly in contradiction 
of that statement. I'm persuaded in that particular case, 
as I am with the earlier situation in 1993 during 
Mr. Morrell's initial visit, that the expression which is 
consistent with the written document is the actual intent. 
And so the last written expression that I have of intent is 
this amendment to the Will and Trust in 2000, July 11th. 
I also would like to talk about Mrs. Morris, 
Horrocks rather. She said... And this is, this is 
contradictory that the testimony was all over the, all 
over the a, wall on this. We had the testimony of 
Mr. Wilson, Mr. Young, Mrs. Young, Mrs. Zufelt and others 
who testified that Russell was to get the property, that was 
the intent. And then I have these written expressions. I 
have testimony from others who report that Mr. Davis at least 
said that his intent, and this would include Mr. Wilson, was 
to provide a way that Russell could buy the property, by 
giving one-fourth to him and one-fourth to his mother he 
could combine those and buy the property. And a, shortly 
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before his death we have a statement that he made to 
Mrs. Horrocks. 
I'm not... I don't think any of these people, as 
Mr. Schmutz pointed out, these are just good people who came 
in. I don't know that I necessarily disbelieve any of 
these people in what they said that Mr. Young or Mrs. Young 
said. I'm just the effect, the weight that I must give that 
is not great though. 
The statement of Mr. Horrocks shortly before his 
death when he was ill from his death, not from his death but 
from his a, illness that led to his death, said that she was 
told by him that Russell would get his, the farm through his 
share of the estate. 
All of this is complicated, in my judgment, by 
what appears that Mr. Davis in fact seemed to be disregarding 
the a, effect of placing the property in Trust. He 
purported to transfer it in 2001, January 1st, albeit as a 
trustee in this case. And then he attempted to make a 
testamentary devise of it later that year. 
It is also complicated by the fact that although a, 
Russell had seen the deed, and I think had the deed in his 
possession then, he, he and his grandpa in effect didn't 
recognize it has being effective because Russell was in 
agreement that he should pay 30,000 and make payments for 
five, six years, 5,000. 
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And I think this happens with people who are not 
schooled. They continue to deal with their property in ways 
that are inconsistent with a trust. As a matter of fact, 
as I previously stated, I want to make clear, that none of 
these are effectual as long as the a, the property remains in 
the, in the Trust. There needs to be some transfer from the 
Trust. 
I'd further like to state that the statement that 
he made on several occasions that he had taken care of the a, 
of these matters and that Russell would have the farm is not 
inherently inconsistent with what I think his actual, and 
I've already stated, over the long haul I think that his 
actual intent was that he would receive it as a partial 
distribution from the Trust and then purchase it and in that 
way receive the property. 
I'd like to also state that there was no evidence 
before the court which would indicate that anybody... And I 
don't recall any evidence, I think the witnesses were asked 
that anybody said that he intended, that he said I intend to 
give it to him as a gift. And I, I don't believe that's the 
case. Based upon all the evidence it's just not there. 
And I guess that has application to the deed 
specifically, the 2001 deed. 
Now, there was some argument and statements based 
upon what Mr. Morrell said. In fact, he was the bad guy 
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according to Ms. Barton-Coombs. He did say that they 
could continue to dispose, to deal with the property as they 
wanted to. I think that's true, he told them that. He did 
tell them that one could act for the other. He did tell 
them that I believe. 
In doing that it's interesting as you play these 
things back what are the assumptions that are made by the 
declarant and what are the assumptions that are made by the 
person who listens to that. And there is a great a, question 
if in eight years later in 2001 whether or not Mr. Davis or 
Mrs. Davis was ever acting upon what they had heard in 
2003. The connection isn't strong. And I don't presume 
that they were. 
I talked about the assumptions that people make. 
And Mr. Morrell assumed that if they were to dispose of 
property it would be by mutual agreement. And he 
specifically said that a, the general statement that they 
could do whatever they wanted did not include a discussion 
that one person could act for the other in contravention of 
the terms of the Trust. That is he didn't say look, 
although the Trust says you can only do it for the a, you 
could only use the Trust for the support and etcetera of each 
other during your lifetime, in spite of that you can transfer 
it without consideration and on, upon one person signing 
only. 
COURT PROCEEDINGS 
1 
2 
3 
4 
5 
6 
7 
8 
9 
10 
11 
12 
13 
14 
15 
16 
17 
18 
19 
20 
21 
22 
23 
24 
25 
So I don't think that his statements can be relied 
upon. And a, in saying that I recognize that he also told 
them that the purpose for the Trust was to provide support. 
And so that combined with the language in the Trust put them 
on notice that they couldn't rely upon any other statement 
that would have led them to believe that they could dispose 
of the property in violation of the Trust. 
Finally, there is no evidence that in signing 
EXHIBIT #15 either party was relying upon those statements. 
After all they were 15, not 15, I was going to say 15, it's 
EXHIBIT #15. They were October, 1993, let's see you've the 
got '93, '94, '95, seven years, seven years and something 
later. There's no indication that a, there's no 
connection, specific connection between a, what 
Mr. and Mrs. Davis did seven years later and these statements 
which were pretty general. 
Also I want to note that a, there are at least 
amendments to the Trust. And it's clear to me at this point 
in time that Mr. and Mrs. Davis knew how to amend the Trust 
and they did that in compliance with the terms of the 
Trust. And since amendment for Trust and revocation are 
contained in the same provision or the same section I assume 
that they, if they would have intended to a, revoke the Trust 
or partly, partially revoked the Trust they would have done 
so by applying the same process that they applied for 
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amendment, which was the same process for revocation. 
So from 1993, October, or December rather when the 
Trust, when the deed was signed, that deed was, and the 
property was part of the Trust rests unless and until it was 
validly transferred. 
There is an issue as to capacity. And I don't 
think that there is any a, real question as to Mr. Davis's 
capacity. No one has really seriously contested that he 
was incapacitated. 
I need to take a look at that because with respect 
to the analysis of EXHIBIT #15 the court needs to decide 
whether or not there is a, whether or not the presumption has 
been overcome that deals with overreaching based upon a 
confidential relationship. And so I'm looking at the 
preparation of the document. It appears that first of all 
this wouldn't be an issue as to Mr. and Mrs. Davis if there 
were fair consideration given. If there were fair 
consideration given even though the person is in a position 
of trust, the fact that there was fair consideration given 
overcomes a presumption as a matter of law. So we're 
dealing with whether or not a, there are other factors in 
view of the fact that there is such a relationship and no 
consideration, other factors which would overcome the 
presumption. 
I find that there are factors which overcome the 
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presumption in Mr. Davis's case. First of all he... Very 
first of all, this is a person that would be the natural... 
Now, in getting to this issue I am assuming that my 
prior ruling is not correct that the fact there's no 
consideration ends the question I'm going for. 
MR. SCHMUTZ: Your Honor, may I ask a question of 
clarification? 
THE JUDGE: Yes. 
MR. SCHMUTZ: Are you finding that there, that 
there is a presumption based on a confidential relationship 
between Russ and Gene? 
THE JUDGE: Russ and Gene? 
MR. SCHMUTZ: Yes. 
THE JUDGE: Absolutely. 
MR. SCHMUTZ: Based on an admission or based on 
facts? 
THE JUDGE: Based upon the facts. 
MR. SCHMUTZ: Perhaps you could articulate that. 
THE JUDGE: Well I'll, I'll articulate it. It 
doesn't make any difference because I'm going to find it's 
been overcome. Do you want me to go very deeply into it? 
MR. SCHMUTZ: No. 
THE JUDGE: Okay. Any presumption would be 
overcome because first of all, if a gift was allowed this is 
a person who would be naturally the subject of a gift. This 
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isn't a gift to somebody they never knew. 
Secondly, Mr. Davis prepared the document and 
executed it before it was presented. So there's none of 
this concern about a person being present or exercising some 
kind of influence. 
And thirdly, I believe that he was consistent with 
the testimony not somebody that was going to be moved in a 
particular direction easily. 
I guess what you're alluding to is the pleadings 
don't admit that there was a confidential relationship. 
MR. SCHMUTZ: That's correct. 
THE JUDGE: To the extent there may have been I 
will find that a, the presumption is overcome in his 
situation. 
EXHIBIT #15 purports to be a transfer by the 
trustee of the Trust, a transfer by both Eugene and Zelma B. 
Davis. And that is interesting. I think I must give legal 
effect to that expression in the sense that although 
Mr. Davis may have had power to do this unilaterally under 
the proper circumstances, here he did not purport to be 
doing it unilaterally. But the expression and the a, 
declaration and description of the grantor is as trustees. 
Neither party signed as trustee and that causes me some 
pause, but I'm willing to go on without specifically ruling 
upon that effect and just assuming that they were attempting 
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to do so. 
I do not give any weight to the word trustee placed 
upon there. That was placed by Ms. Sanchez. 
There was no discussion, she had no discussion 
with these people about putting that there. And a, you 
know, that cause me to have a little bit of concern about how 
she's acting in this whole process. She came with an 
opinion and a, I think she was trying to bring about the 
result of her opinion by adding the word trustee. Since it 
was placed on the document by a third person without 
consulting with anybody and after the death of one of the 
signators it is wholly inconsequential. I've give no weight 
to that. 
If Mr. Davis, Eugene Davis was capable of 
transferring this without consideration, without the 
signature of his wife, without amending the Trust or revoking 
the Trust I suppose this would have transferred the property 
because he was capable of acting. 
I find that it does not transfer the property for 
all of the reasons I've stated. I don't want to go back over 
those reasons because I'm afraid I might miss one. I think 
I've ruled on all of those issues. 
And I just added one that I hadn't spoken of before 
and that is that the document on its face purports to be, 
transfer from both people and it was only signed by one 
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initially, by Mr. Davis. So I don't, I think they both 
needed to sign it under those circumstances. 
To the extent that we need to get to the issue of 
whether or not Mrs. Davis signed that as an effective 
transfer in 2003, there was prior argument that a sole 
trustee may, who is the sole beneficiary, may transfer the 
property without consideration. I believe I've already 
ruled upon that. But I'd like to add to that the issue 
as to whether or not the presumption has been overcome. 
By pleading and by fact I think that there is a confidential 
relationship here between a, Mr. Russell and his grandmother 
Zelma, Mr. Young and Mrs. Davis, Zelma Davis. His father 
died, and in effect Mr. Davis became his father. He was 
over there all the time. And in the process of that he was 
also more, much more deeply involved with his relationship 
with his grandmother than he normally would have been. That 
is for the reason that they lived right across from each 
other number one, his father was gone, he was over there all 
the time, Mr. Davis was functioning as a father. And I 
believe factually there is a confidential relationship over 
time which developed between these, these people factually. 
As I indicated, this situation arises when there is 
a confidential relationship and there is no adequate 
consideration. If there would have been adequate 
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consideration we would be out of here. There is not 
adequate consideration nor any claim. 
To overcome the presumption Mr. Young and 
Ms. Zufelt introduced evidence that Mr. and Mrs. Davis, Zelma 
and Eugene, had long desired to give the property to Russell 
and that the deed was just an expression of that longly held 
desire. 
For all of the reasons I've already indicated I 
do not believe that there was such a long and consistent 
desire to give the property. To do so would to ignore 
considerable believable evidence which is contrary to that 
theory, and to ignore the effect of specific documents which 
were formalized and signed, specifically the initial deed and 
the 2000 amendment, and the a, testimony I've received as to 
the 1994 amendment which I am aware was, may not have been 
signed but that's consistent with the theory. And I think 
it's consistent that they did intend for Russell to get it. 
But if I had to express one intent over a long period of 
time it would be that he pay for it. 
But I don't think it's appropriate to look at 
something and say over a long period of time he, these people 
had any specific intent because as is evident from the 
documentation intent changed over time. 
What I'm just saying is I don't, I don't give a 
lot of weight to this idea that in signing the document in 
COURT PROCEEDINGS 
PAGE 857 
1 
2 
3 
4 
5 
6 
7 
8 
9 
10 
11 
12 
13 
14 
15 
16 
17 
18 
19 
20 
21 
22 
23 
24 
25 
2003 Mrs. Davis was just putting into her a, into effect 
something that had always been the case. That was not 
always the case. 
Indeed there's no indication, as I've indicated, 
that they ever intended to ever give a gift outright. And 
there is a statement in 2000 at least that leads the court to 
believe that Mrs. Davis at least may not have been happy 
about giving him one-fourth. There was some statement, a 
statement that a, was made by Mr. Morrell that said well 
when I arrived there they weren't in agreement but he 
convinced her to do what we did. Well, what they did was 
changed the provision with respect to Russell. And a, I 
think it's more likely that that was the case. It could 
have been that Mrs. Davis was wanting to do more, but given 
the timing of that Arizona property I think it was that she 
didn't want to do as much. 
I think it's appropriate to really focus in on 
what the intent was and what the ability to form the intent 
and dispose of the property was at the time that she signed 
the deed. I've said that there was no evidence before the 
court that a gift was intended. I suppose the deed may be 
construed as such evidence because it was given without 
consideration so I'm aware of that. 
The evidence as to capacity is greatly in 
conflict. And it's clear that her capacity was changing 
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over time and sometimes from moment to moment. The 
important time, however, is the time that the deed was 
executed. I'm aware that I only have the testimony of 
Ms. Sanchez and Mr. Young as to what her capacity was at that 
moment, and I'll deal with that. 
I find that since 1994 Mrs. Davis's mental 
condition, at least after she made her recovery from the 
stroke, after that point in time, deteriorated. Several 
years before this there were indications from doctors' notes 
and her own statement, and the testimony of everybody that 
her mental abilities were going downhill. As has been 
pointed out, she stopped paying the bills approximately 
two years before this event. And I agree with Mr. Schmutz's 
statement that that may well have been an expression of a, 
her deterioration in her physical ability rather than a 
deterioration of her mental ability. And I believe that it 
was primarily an issue of a, her depreciating physical 
health. Nevertheless, it is clear to me that her mental 
health was also in general in decline. 
Also I note that she suffered during these periods 
of time with depression and fits of anger. She was not 
well enough just before Mr. Davis's death to attend him, 
attend him at his hospital and be there during his last 
hours. Again, I think that that was really primarily an 
issue of physical health. Mr. Davis passed away on 
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March 12th, 2006. 
MR. SCHMUTZ: 2003. 
THE JUDGE: 2003. I actually wrote 2006 in my 
notes. Thanks for the correction. 
The funeral was held on March 18th, 2003. 
There is no question in my mind that between those 
periods of times and beyond she was in serious distress. 
This was an 84 year old woman. I had her date of 
birth of February 15, 1919 and if my math is correct, which I 
tend to think it would be, by 2003 in February she would have 
turned 84. She had just lost her husband of 60 years, she 
was the not in general, a general state of health either 
mentally or physically, and she was under great distress at 
the time of the funeral and for some time thereafter, 
including the time that this deed was signed. 
My last statement which goes beyond the time of 
the funeral, it's obvious from the funeral she was saying 
when is he going to arrive at the party, she was thinking it 
was a party, she didn't recognize people she was related to, 
knew well, and she was just not communicative, communicative 
in her conversation. I further have the testimony that that 
situation continued during the time that Mr. Steven Davis had 
her until a, she was delivered. 
There is believable evidence to that extent and 
that is that she didn't recognize people, she hadn't accepted 
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the truth of her husband's death and a, she thought that the 
funeral was a party and that her husband was in transit to 
the party. 
On the other hand, there is also believable 
evidence that she had moments of clarity throughout that time 
period where she did recognize people and her situation and 
that her husband had passed away. So it wasn't all of one 
or the other during this period of time which began upon the 
death and, and continued past the signing of EXHIBIT #15. 
Given her age, her prior mental condition and deterioration, 
her physical condition, the shock of losing her husband, it 
does not seem to me unusual that she would have during these 
periods both periods of clarity as well as periods of utter 
confusion. 
One thing I do not believe. I do not believe that 
under these situations she was capable of focusing on an 
issue, single issue such as the issue of signing this deed 
and continually focusing on that issue. There's been some 
testimony to that effect. I just don't believe that she was 
capable of doing that. This kind of focus is not consistent 
with the testimony of other witnesses and is not what court 
believes. 
Nor do I believe that Mrs. Sanchez was summoned at 
the request of Zelma Davis. Indeed Mrs. Sanchez's statement 
during her testimony was that she was there at the request of 
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Pat and Russell. And I think that that's who initiated 
getting her there. 
Now you could argue, and I'll clarify that, all 
that meant was that they were the facilitators. No, I'm not 
saying that. They were the instigators of getting her there, 
I believe. 
I'm also concerned with a statement that she 
apparently made to Mrs. Young to this effect. And this I 
recognize must have been after this thing kind of all blew up 
which is in early June, but is close in time and has 
relevance. She said I don't know what, why they're arguing 
over this because Russell gets the farm and the others get 
the house. Now that goes directly to one of the issues 
that is important in determining ability to a, transfer 
property, capacity. That was a third issue. Which as I 
recall, correct me if I'm wrong, was an ability to dispose 
of property according to a plan. And I don't think she had 
that, because her understanding of what she did is not 
consistent with what she did if she signed the deed and 
transferred the property. Her understanding was that that 
act would result in Mr. Young not getting anything from the 
Trust, the home would be split between the other people. 
That's not the effect of the signature. I think that's 
significant. 
Also I am concerned about the fact that a, this 
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document was signed when Ms. Davis was under the care of 
Mr. Young and/or his family. And as I indicated he was 
responsible for initiating the notary. I believe at that 
time she was in a condition which given her age, the 
relationship that she had with her grandson, her mental 
situation and her emotional state, and the timing of this so 
close to the passing of Mr. Young, Mr. Davis, that she was 
very susceptible to not only overt but subtle pressures. 
Mr. Young was there, brought the person in. He 
left the room. Actually that wasn't the testimony of 
Ms. Sanchez but I'll give him that, he left the room. I 
don't think that cured the problem. I don't think just 
bringing somebody in and setting them up in a situation 
where they're going to act in a particular way and then 
leaving the room dissipates the, the factor that they were 
present. I think that that is a factor. It certainly 
doesn't mitigate in favor of a finding that there was no 
overreaching. I indicated with Mr. Davis that it was 
important to me, and considering that I don't know if I 
needed to, but it is important that these were things that 
were initiated by others. 
I also have a statement by Arlene Horrocks that 
during this period of time Ms. Davis... 
I'm trying to, I'm trying to bring all this in, 
all of the things that teach me what her situation may have 
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been on the date it was signed which was the 21st of March, 
2001 . 
And Ms. Arlene Horrocks said that she wasn't able 
to get her thoughts together, and that was prior to the 
death. 
Dr. Ripplinger actually wasn't very helpful except 
to say that he noticed the deterioration before and that he 
thought that it had progressed until he saw her again which 
was after March 21st, 2006. And I don't know that her, his 
statement as to her capacity is very helpful except it kind 
of gives the court an idea of how things progressed. And 
then it's not as helpful as I would have hoped because he 
said it can be fast or slow. 
Some of these statements that I've received from 
witnesses indicate to me that she was having before, 
immediately before the death she was having a, noticeable 
problems in her thought process. 
The ultimate issue I think with respect to, that 
I've got to decide is whether or not she was a, in a 
situation where she could dispose of her property. I'm 
going to make two findings because I think both, I'm 
persuaded in both ways. 
First, I will find that she was not in a condition 
or state of mind to dispose of property. And I'm aware of 
the considerations in Ioup (phonetic) that were given to 
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me. Given her age, her demonstrated deterioration in her 
mental capacity, and the fact that I think that she was 
having significant problems mentally before she went into her 
husband's death, the fact she suffered from depression, 
although that's not a, a huge a.... I'll just take that 
out. I'm not very, that convinced by that. Her emotional 
state caused by the loss of her husband, and the short 
period of time between the time when she lost her husband and 
the time this was signed, which for a long period of time she 
was just not able to function at all, and given the fact that 
a, the beneficiary was present, the fact that her statement 
as a result of her conduct is not consistent with the result, 
that is she did not effect a result if the deed would have 
been good which would have resulted in her statement that 
Russell would have the farm and the others would have the 
home. 
I believe two things. First, that Mr. Young has 
failed to overcome presumption. Even recognizing the 
testimony of a, those who were present at the time I am not 
convinced that the presumption is overcome or that she, or 
were there no presumption that she was in a condition or 
state of mind to sign that deed. 
Let's take about five minutes and let me go back in 
to see if I need to do anything. Can you think of anything 
I need to do that I haven't done here? Anyone? 
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MR. HATCH: No, Your Honor. Your Honor, the only 
is the issue of attorney's fees but I'm sure the court is 
going to address that later. 
THE JUDGE: Well, I'm having a hard time thinking 
that you should be have, given attorney's fees here. 
MR. HATCH: Are you inviting a comment? 
THE JUDGE: Yes, I suppose I should. 
MR. HATCH: Your Honor, for all the reasons you 
just expressed just lately there. The timing, her 
condition and, and all of that, and the secrecy under which 
it was undertaken and not disclosed, the time period from the 
taking of the documents to when they were ever revealed, all 
of that just is so improper that the taking of an elderly 
lady's property. 
THE JUDGE: Are you relying upon, what is it, 
78-56-27 or something like that? 
MR. HATCH: I, your memory is way better than 
mine, 
say 
THE JUDGE: Well. I'll see how good it is, let me 
MR. SCHMUTZ: It's the bad faith statute, Your 
Honor. It refers to the maintenance, or to the— 
THE JUDGE: Is that the statute? Did I get it 
right? 
MR. SCHMUTZ: It's 57. I'm sure you said 57, 78— 
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THE JUDGE: 26-57? 
MR. SCHMUTZ: 27-56 or 57. That deals with 
commencement or maintenance of a lawsuit in bad faith. 
THE JUDGE: I thought it was 78-56-27. I'm going 
to look where I said first. 
MR. SCHMUTZ: And you might be right. 
MR. HATCH: And, and also relying on the statement 
o f — 
THE JUDGE: Wait a minute. 
MR. HATCH: Okay. 
THE JUDGE: Did they take that out of the 
statute? Well, it requires bad faith anyway. 
MR. SCHMUTZ: Well, it deals with the maintenance, 
with the initiation or maintenance of a lawsuit. It requires 
bad faith in conducting of the, of the lawsuit. And there is 
no other, there is, fees can only be addressed foundation of 
a statutory statement or contract. 
THE JUDGE: I wish I had the statute. What's the 
one you gave me, 78-27? 
MR. SCHMUTZ: I think it's 78-27-5 6. 
THE JUDGE: Oh, you're probably right. 
MR. SCHMUTZ: I'm not sure. 
THE JUDGE: Attorney's fees, you're right. 
In civil actions the court shall... 
Mandatory ... award reasonable 
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attorney's fees to the prevailing party 
if the court discerns that the action or 
defense to the action was without merit 
or not brought or asserted in good 
faith. The court in its discretion may 
award no fees or limited fees against a 
party under subsection (1), but only if 
the court finds the party has filed an 
affidavit of impecuniosity in the action 
before the court or the court enters of 
record the reasons for not doing it. 
Okay. This is what you're asking for under this 
statute? 
MR. HATCH: And also we're relying on the court's 
ruling, I think it was after the second motion for summary 
judgment, where the court indicated that if the facts were 
indeed represented the court would, I can't remember if the 
word was consider awarding of attorney's fees or would award 
attorney's fees. 
MR. SCHMUTZ: No, that's... The court just simply 
referenced the statute in that ruling. The court would have 
to make a finding, which it has not done, that this action 
has been commenced or maintained in bad faith. 
THE JUDGE: I'm having problems with that in view 
of all that's complicated here, and particularly in view of 
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the fact that I think Mr. Schmutz relied upon the statute 
that was in effect, as you relied upon a statute that was in 
effect. And the analysis would have been different. I kind 
of went into how I would have looked at that, but I don't 
think I fully expanded upon it. So I don't think that 
there's bad faith here, I'm not going to find bad faith. 
I am going to take a recess and see if I can think 
of anything else I need to say. I'd invite you folks to 
consider if there's additional findings or conclusions or 
orders I ought to enter. We'll be in recess. 
(Recess). 
THE JUDGE: Thank you. Please be seated. 
I've reviewed my notes again. I think I mentioned 
most things. Is there something that a, the parties need me 
to rule upon or deal with? 
MS. BARTON-COOMBS: No, Your Honor. 
THE JUDGE: This will serve as... 
Well, let me add one more thing. That the Trust 
was a, I think intended to cover the very situation that 
we're dealing with, that is a situation where Ms., Mrs. Zelma 
was, Ms. Zelma Davis was not capable of acting. 
I will order that the a... How do we want to 
effect this in terms of do you want a deed signed by, 
transferring it back? How is the appropriate way to effect 
this? 
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MR. HATCH: Your Honor, my original thought was 
maybe filing or recording the order. But it's going to be 
probably pretty lengthy and it would be, it would be simpler 
and less paper certainly for a — 
THE JUDGE: Quit claim back? 
MR. HATCH: Yes. 
THE JUDGE: Any reason I should not order that? 
MR. SCHMUTZ: We're going to be appealing this in 
a stay, Your Honor. We'll put that motion before you so it 
might be premature to effectuate. No parties are going to be 
harmed by having the a... We have significant concerns about 
Russ a, with his a, livestock and his equipment and other 
things that he owns on the farm where he has no immediate 
place to put those, so we are concerned about, about the 
status of the issue. And a, so I would suggest that the 
court enter the order and then that order, of course, would 
be referred to the a, present action that is pending before 
Judge Anderson where the estate can be dealt with. As we 
indicated earlier the court would be making a ruling here as 
to where the property should reside. 
THE JUDGE: Well, and I understand I believe that 
you would like to have the opportunity to have this 
reviewed. But, you know, you're not entitled to a stay in 
the order until that is reviewed. You're entitled to the 
effect of the decision, unless you post and the court 
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approves an appropriate— 
MR. SCHMUTZ: We recognize that. 
THE JUDGE: — bond. 
MR. SCHMUTZ: Well, all I'm suggesting is that to 
a, move with the deed before the order is signed and would be 
precipitous and may create some kind of harm that none of the 
parties want I don't think with respect to Russ's livestock 
and so forth that is out there. So what we would suggest is 
the court enter its order and then refer the matter to the 
estate. 
THE JUDGE: Well no, I don't— 
MR. HATCH: Your Honor— 
THE JUDGE: You're entitled to a ruling based upon 
my order, not to refer it to another judge who doesn't 
understand what happened here, you're entitled to a ruling 
and order. 
MR. SCHMUTZ: I'm expecting the court to enter an 
order. 
THE JUDGE: Well, the order would be that they 
execute a Quit Claim Deed or a, that would set aside the 
conveyance. 
MR. SCHMUTZ: And what we'd ask for is an 
appropriate time period that within the court for that to 
occur. 
THE JUDGE: Okay. What would you suggest? 
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MR. SCHMUTZ: I think 60 days, would that be 
appropriate? 
MR. HATCH: Your Honor, the parties have observed 
Russ moving the animals on and off the property several times 
this summer, or at least observed them being gone and then 
when they come back, and so he doesn't need that much time, a 
few days would be appropriate. 
MR. SCHMUTZ: I think 60 days would be reasonable 
for that. 
MR. HATCH: Well he's had the use of it for 41 
plus months now. 
MR. SCHMUTZ: He's actually been operating the 
farm for most of his life. He's got a lot of things out 
there, he's got livestock. 
MR. HATCH: Well he shouldn't be removing any of 
his grandfather's— 
THE JUDGE: Well, I think that let's not argue 
about all of this stuff. 
MR. HATCH: Sure. 
THE JUDGE: One of the things that wasn't asked 
for was damages and a, so we're not dealing with damages. 
But I really believe that you're entitled to your order. 
It's just not okay. There's been a determination and 
there's no effect of that. And I think I should issue it and 
we shouldn't refer to it another judge who doesn't understand 
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what's going on. I need to take responsibility for what I've 
done. 
And there is a process for the, the appeal to, to 
allow a party to not suffer the effects of the order while 
the matter is being appealed. That can all wait, I 
suppose. There are a couple things. Now I have an order, 
he has a title in his, in his name recorded. 
MR. SCHMUTZ: Correct. 
THE JUDGE: Is there a lis pendens? 
MR. HATCH: There is. 
THE JUDGE: So that ought to protect you here. 
I think 60 days is much too long to move cattle and, and a, 
tractors. I'm involved on a, occasion and too often to tell 
people to move from their house in five to 10 days which is 
certainly more difficult than moving cows from property or 
equipment. So give me a time that's more reasonable for him 
to be there. 
MR. SCHMUTZ: Well, you're asking me to negotiate 
down, Your Honor. But the reason I suggest that is because 
the farm has been, you know, effectively operated by Russ and 
owned and/or possessed by Russ for these years. There's no 
indication whatsoever of any hardship to the estate over a 60 
day period. 
THE JUDGE: It's not a matter of hardship, it's a 
matter of right. I mean, you can't say well you own it but 
COURT PROCEEDINGS 
gee I, I don't think you're going to have a hardship if I 
stay there. That's not the issue. The issue is who has 
the right to be there. They do according to my order, the 
Trust. 
MR. SCHMUTZ: Well, Russ is one of they. 
THE JUDGE: But he's not the trustee. 
MR. SCHMUTZ: But I would then ask the court for 
something— 
THE JUDGE: I'm willing to do it but 60 is too 
long. 
MR. HATCH: Your Honor, we believe he has 16 cows 
and a couple of horses. 
MR. SCHMUTZ: I'd ask, I'd ask the court to issue 
to include in its order that 30 days from the entry of the 
order that Russ have his (short inaudible, no mic). 
THE JUDGE: Is there any reason that he couldn't 
do this in 10 days? 
MR. SCHMUTZ: Yes. I do think it's difficult to 
do it in 10 days. So if we set a reasonable period from the 
time that the order is entered then he'll do his best to 
comply with that. 
THE JUDGE: Well, the order could go back and 
forth as you know for a long time. 
MR. HATCH: I think he's counting on that. 
Your Honor, the order is effective again against the people 
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that are in court on the day the court issues it, and that is 
not— 
THE JUDGE: Well, there's a dispute as to when an 
order becomes effective, when it's signed or when it's 
announced. And I suppose in a very legal sense it's not 
effective until it's signed. But I could issue two things. 
I could issue an order based upon my findings which I think 
are sufficient. I don't need anybody to prepare my findings 
here, that just says you're to vacate the property and a, and 
a, transfer the deed or an order that says it could be 
recorded. But the deed is of no force and effect, null 
and void. I can do all of that. But I want to be fair to 
him— 
MR. SCHMUTZ: That's what I'm asking you to do. 
THE JUDGE: — recognizing their interest in the, 
in the property at this point. 
MR. SCHMUTZ: That's what I'm asking you to do is 
just be fair to them, and I've given you what I thought was a 
reasonable period. 
THE JUDGE: Why don't you do this, Mr. Young in 10 
days? What would prevent you? I know what you have to do, 
you have to find a place for your cattle. Do you have some 
property, do you have some— 
MR. YOUNG: I'll to find a place. I'll have hay 
to move, my equipment to move, my animals to move. Plus I'll 
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have to stay working in Orem. 
THE JUDGE: How much hay do you have? 
MR. YOUNG: I think I have close to 30 tone. 
THE JUDGE: What does that look like if I looked 
at it? 
SPEAKER: It would fill this room. 
MR. YOUNG: Quite a bit. 
THE JUDGE: Fill this room how high? 
MR. YOUNG: It would probably, it wouldn't be to 
the ceiling but it would fill up this, this room probably 
within a couple of feet of the ceiling. 
THE JUDGE: Okay. And in order to do that you've 
got to, you've got to get some equipment and you can, you 
don't do that with a pickup truck I take it. 
MR. YOUNG: I do it with my 5th-wheel trailer and 
by hand. 
MR. SCHMUTZ: Do have a place to put it. 
MR. HATCH: Where does he put them when he moved 
them off? 
THE JUDGE: He's got to, that's the other thing 
he's got to do, he's got to find a place to put them. 
MR. HATCH: But he, but he has been able to find a 
place when he's moved them off, he's found a place to put 
them. 
THE JUDGE: Do you have a place to put your 
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I have a lease I could use, yes. 
You could use the lease. Does it have 
No. I have to haul water down. 
So you, this had water on it and you 
cows? 
MR. YOUNG: 
THE JUDGE: 
water on it? 
MR. YOUNG: 
THE JUDGE: 
weren't hauling water here. 
MR. YOUNG: That's correct. 
THE JUDGE: I guess that's of no consequence. If 
you have a lease place we've solved that problem. Now we 
get to the equipment is no problem and the cattle is no 
problem really in moving. 
MR. YOUNG: It's just time to, you know, do it and 
stay working. 
THE JUDGE: At your job? 
MR. YOUNG: Yes. 
THE JUDGE: Okay. Recognizing that a, the ruling 
I've made what do you think would be a reasonable period of 
time? 
Three weeks. 
I can, I can buy three weeks. 
How many days, Your Honor? 
Twenty from today, 21 from today. 
Your Honor, maybe... I would request, 
MR. YOUNG: 
THE JUDGE: 
MR. HATCH: 
THE JUDGE: 
MR. HATCH: 
I think, and wait for the, for the Quit Claim Deed, maybe it 
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would be more appropriate to have an order just ordering that 
the, that the deed... I don't know what they do in the 
recorder office if they can destroy them or just what do they 
do. 
THE JUDGE: They don't destroy anything there. 
MR. HATCH: I didn't think so. Order that it 
is— 
THE JUDGE: It would just be in the chain of title 
and I think it would be more effective to be in the chain of 
title to have a quit claim back. But a— 
MR. HATCH: That I'm sure could be done, mailed to 
us in a week or less. 
THE JUDGE: Is there any problem with that? 
MR. SCHMUTZ: Pardon me? 
THE JUDGE: Any problem with a, Mr. Hatch 
preparing a Quit Claim Deed back to the Trust, upon your 
review he's to sign it and get that within five days. 
MR. SCHMUTZ: I would have a problem just 
procedurally with that in respect we don't want that to be 
treated as an admission or concession of a volitional 
transfer where we would be— 
THE JUDGE: Would you prefer to have just an order 
setting aside the a, the a deed with specific reference in 
declaring it null and void, ab initio. 
MR. SCHMUTZ: You know, my own impression, and I 
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really don't have a good answer for Your Honor, is that a 
judicial deed would probably be best. 
THE JUDGE: I don't like to get into that. I'd 
rather do an order that it's of no, no force and effect. 
Which I'll do. You submit that. 
Now in the deed, the order must specifically refer 
to the transfer by a, the date it was signed in this case 
January 1st, 2001, who the grantor and grantee are, the entry 
number and a, order that a, it is void and of no effect ab 
initio, that I think means never had effect. 
MR. HATCH: Okay. All right. 
THE JUDGE: Send that to Mr. Schmutz for his 
approval as to form and then to the court. 
MR. SCHMUTZ: I think probably Ms. Barton-Coombs 
should also review that, Your Honor? 
MR. HATCH: Well sure, I'll send a copy to each. 
THE JUDGE: Okay. Well I don't want to a, get 
involved in a situation where we're taking more than 21 days 
to sign orders. 
MR. SCHMUTZ: Let's just follow the rules on it 
then. 
THE JUDGE: Will that get it done in 21 days? 
MR. SCHMUTZ: Well I think if he submits, prepares 
and submits an order, we have five days to review and 
objection. 
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THE JUDGE: Okay. 
MR. SCHMUTZ: And I think that's the rule. 
THE JUDGE: Then he can submit it to me unless 
there's an objection. 
MR. SCHMUTZ: If there's an objection the court 
can accept the, either make decisions or accept the objection 
(short inaudible, no mic). 
THE JUDGE: Any objection will be considered on my 
next law and motion date after Monday which is the 16th of 
October. I'll set that date right now. 
MR. SCHMUTZ: What date, what time was that, 
Your Honor? 
THE JUDGE: It will be 1:30. Well, let's make it, 
let's make it 3:30. 
MR. SCHMUTZ: Is that in this courtroom o r — 
THE JUDGE: It's my law and motion calendar. 
Anything further? 
MR. HATCH: No. Thank you, Your Honor. 
THE JUDGE: We will adjourn. 
WHEREUPON, the hearing was concluded. 
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